Arbeitspapier
Higher tax morale implies a higher optimal income tax rate
We analyze the impact of (exogenous) tax morale on the optimal design of progressive income taxation. In our model, only universal basic income (transfer) is financed from a linear income tax and the financing of public goods is neglected. Each individual supplies labor and (un)declares earning, depending on his labor disutility and tax morale, respectively. Limiting the utilitarianism to the poorer parts of the population (defined by the welfare share), the optimal tax rate is an increasing function of the tax morale and a decreasing function of the welfare share.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- ISBN
-
978-615-5024-76-4
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2011/37
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Public Goods
Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
- Thema
-
tax morale
progressive income tax
undeclared earning
labor supply
income redistribution
Steuermoral
Wirkungsanalyse
Steuerprogression
Einkommensteuer
Arbeitsangebot
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Simonovits, András
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Budapest
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Simonovits, András
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2011
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