Arbeitspapier

Nice guys finish last: Are people with higher tax morale taxed more heavily?

This paper provides evidence of efficient taxation of groups with heterogeneous levels of tax morale. We set up an optimal income tax model where high tax morale implies a high subjective cost of evading taxes. The model predicts that nice guys finish last: groups with higher tax morale will be taxed more heavily, simply because taxing them is less costly. Based on unique cross-country micro data and an IV approach to rule out reverse causality, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. Income groups with high tax morale systematically face higher average and marginal tax rates. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate whether differences in tax morale affect the distribution of the tax burden across different groups of taxpayers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3858

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Thema
tax morale
tax compliance
optimal taxation
political economy
Steuermoral
Steuerbelastung
Optimale Besteuerung
Public Choice
Schätzung
Welt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Philipp Doerrenberg
Denvil Duncan
Clemens Fuest
Andreas Peichl
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Philipp Doerrenberg
  • Denvil Duncan
  • Clemens Fuest
  • Andreas Peichl
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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