Arbeitspapier
Tax avoidance and optimal income tax enforcement
We examine the optimal auditing problem of a tax authority when taxpayers can choose both to evade and avoid. For a convex penalty function the incentive-compatibility constraints may bind for the richest taxpayer and at a positive level of both evasion and avoidance. The audit function is non-increasing in reported income, and is higher for progressive tax functions than for regressive tax functions. Higher marginal tax rates increase the incentives for non-compliance, overturning the well-known Yitzhaki paradox.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IFS Working Papers ; No. W17/08
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Thema
-
Tax avoidance
Tax evasion
Optimal auditing
Tax administration
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gamannossi degl'Innocenti, Duccio
Rablen, Matthew D.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
- (wo)
-
London
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.1920/WP.IFS.2017.1708
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gamannossi degl'Innocenti, Duccio
- Rablen, Matthew D.
- Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
Entstanden
- 2017