Arbeitspapier

Tax avoidance and optimal income tax enforcement

We examine the optimal auditing problem of a tax authority when taxpayers can choose both to evade and avoid. For a convex penalty function the incentive-compatibility constraints may bind for the richest taxpayer and at a positive level of both evasion and avoidance. The audit function is non-increasing in reported income, and is higher for progressive tax functions than for regressive tax functions. Higher marginal tax rates increase the incentives for non-compliance, overturning the well-known Yitzhaki paradox.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFS Working Papers ; No. W17/08

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Thema
Tax avoidance
Tax evasion
Optimal auditing
Tax administration

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gamannossi degl'Innocenti, Duccio
Rablen, Matthew D.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
(wo)
London
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.1920/WP.IFS.2017.1708
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gamannossi degl'Innocenti, Duccio
  • Rablen, Matthew D.
  • Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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