Arbeitspapier
Tax morale and optimal taxation
We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between two tax regimes to fund a public good. The first-best tax regime imposes a general, distortion-free income tax. However, this tax cannot be enforced. The second-best alternative supplements the income tax by a specific commodity tax. This tax cannot be evaded but distorts optimal consumption choices, instead. The result is that a large majority of subjects prefer the general income tax regime. The bulk of votes is consistent with actual payoffs. We isolate tax morale as cause for payoffs above theoretical predictions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1284
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
-
optimal taxation
tax evasion
voting
experiments
Optimale Besteuerung
Steuersystem
Steuermoral
Wahlverhalten
Experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gueth, Werner
Sausgruber, Rupert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gueth, Werner
- Sausgruber, Rupert
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2004
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Progressive taxation and tax morale
Optimal income taxation with tax competition
Higher tax morale implies a higher optimal income tax rate
Optimal taxation when the tax burden matters
Optimal capital income taxation with tax evasion
Optimal representative taxation, information and tax reform
Does higher tax morale imply higher optimal labor income tax rate?
Tax Morale
Tax Incidence and Optimal Forest Taxation under Stochastic Demand
Nonlinear Tax Incidence and Optimal Taxation in General Equilibrium
Tax Morale and Institutions
Tax Compliance, Tax Morale and Governance Quality
Progressive taxation and tax morale
Optimal income taxation with tax competition
Higher tax morale implies a higher optimal income tax rate
Optimal taxation when the tax burden matters
Optimal capital income taxation with tax evasion
Optimal representative taxation, information and tax reform
Does higher tax morale imply higher optimal labor income tax rate?
Tax Morale
Tax Incidence and Optimal Forest Taxation under Stochastic Demand
Nonlinear Tax Incidence and Optimal Taxation in General Equilibrium
Tax Morale and Institutions
Tax Compliance, Tax Morale and Governance Quality
Progressive taxation and tax morale
Optimal income taxation with tax competition
Higher tax morale implies a higher optimal income tax rate
Optimal taxation when the tax burden matters
Optimal capital income taxation with tax evasion
Optimal representative taxation, information and tax reform
Does higher tax morale imply higher optimal labor income tax rate?
Tax Morale
Tax Incidence and Optimal Forest Taxation under Stochastic Demand
Nonlinear Tax Incidence and Optimal Taxation in General Equilibrium
Tax Morale and Institutions