Arbeitspapier

Optimal taxation when the tax burden matters

Survey evidence shows that the magnitude of the tax liability plays a role in value judgements about which groups deserve tax breaks. We demonstrate that the German tax-transfer system conflicts with a welfarist inequality averse social planner. It is consistent with a planner who is averse to both inequality and high tax liabilities. The tax-transfer schedule reflects non-welfarist value judgements of citizens or different aims of policy makers. We extend our analysis to several European countries and the USA and show that their redistributive systems can be rationalized with an inequality averse social planner for whom the tax burden matters.

Sprache
Englisch
ISBN
978-3-96973-102-4

Erschienen in
Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 941

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Welfare Economics: General
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Thema
Justness
optimal taxation
income redistribution
inequality
welfare criteria

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jessen, Robin
Metzing, Maria
Rostam-Afschar, Davud
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
(wo)
Essen
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.4419/96973102
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jessen, Robin
  • Metzing, Maria
  • Rostam-Afschar, Davud
  • RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung

Entstanden

  • 2022

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