Arbeitspapier
Strategic capacity choice under uncertainty: the impact of market structure on investment and welfare
We analyze a market game where firms choose capacities under uncertainty about future market conditions and make output choices after uncertainty has unraveled. We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under imperfect competition and establish that capacity choices by strategic firms are generally too low from a welfare point of view. We also demonstrate that strategic firms choose even lower capacities if they anticipate competitive spot market pricing (e.g. due to regulatory intervention). We finally illustrate how the model can be used to assess the impact of electricity market liberalization on total capacity and welfare by fitting it to the data of the German electricity market.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IWQW Discussion Papers ; No. 01/2008
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Perfect Competition
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
demand uncertainty
cost uncertainty
Cournot competition
First Best
Second Best
capacity obligations
spot market regulation
Elektrizitätswirtschaft
Kapazitätsplanung
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Marktstruktur
Spieltheorie
Spotmarkt
Regulierung
Investition
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Theorie
Zoettl, Gregor
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Grimm, Veronika
- Zoettl, Gregor
- Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW)
Entstanden
- 2008