Arbeitspapier
Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players
We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,122
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Labor Contracts
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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Coalitions
Core
Stability
Status-seeking
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lazarova, Emiliya
Dimitrov, Dinko
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lazarova, Emiliya
- Dimitrov, Dinko
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2010
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