Arbeitspapier
On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games
We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Papers ; No. 374
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
- Thema
-
Additivity
Coalition formation
Core
Co-NP completeness
Hedonic games
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Sung, Shao Chin
Dimitrov, Dinko
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-8206
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Sung, Shao Chin
- Dimitrov, Dinko
- Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Entstanden
- 2005
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