Arbeitspapier
On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability
The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition property guarantees the existence of semistrictly core stable coalition structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Papers ; No. 377
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
Coalition formation
Common ranking property
Hedonic games
Semistrict core
Top coalition property
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dimitrov, Dinko
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-8232
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dimitrov, Dinko
- Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Entstanden
- 2005
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