Monografie
Government versus opposition. Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Identifier
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1247713911
- Reihe
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Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 375
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Dimitrov, Dinko
Haake, Claus-Jochen
- URN
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
26.01.2023, 13:53 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Monografie
Beteiligte
- Dimitrov, Dinko
- Haake, Claus-Jochen
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