Arbeitspapier
A "fractal" solution to the chopstick auction
This paper constructs a novel equilibrium in the chopstick auction of Szentes and Rosenthal (Games and Economic Behavior, 2003a, 2003b). In contrast to the existing solution, the identified equilibrium strategy allows a simple and intuitive characterization. Moreover, its best-response set has the same Hausdorff dimension as its support, which may be seen as a robustness property. The analysis also reveals some new links to the literature on Blotto games.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 229
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Mathematical Methods
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
- Thema
-
Chopstick auction
Exposure problem
Self-similarity
Blotto games
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ewerhart, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-124625
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ewerhart, Christian
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2017
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