Arbeitspapier
Rent-seeking games and the all-pay auction
This paper considers rent-seeking games in which a small percentage change in a player's bid has a large percentage impact on her odds of winning, i.e., on the ratio of her respective probabilities of winning and losing. An example is the Tullock contest with a high R. The analysis provides a fairly complete characterization of the equilibrium set. In particular, for "sufficiently generic" valuations, any equilibrium of the rent-seeking game is shown to be both payoff- and revenue-equivalent to the first-price all-pay auction. For general valuations, the analysis establishes a robustness property of the all-pay auction.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 186
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Rationing; Licensing
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- Thema
-
Rent-seeking games
mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium
robustness of the all-pay auction
Tullock contest
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ewerhart, Christian
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2015
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-107344
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ewerhart, Christian
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2015
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