Arbeitspapier
Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players
It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r È 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a contest technology with higher accuracy.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 243
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Labor Discrimination
- Thema
-
Tullock contest
Nash equilibrium
heterogeneous valuations
discrimination
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ewerhart, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-135994
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ewerhart, Christian
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2017
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