Arbeitspapier

Forward Contracts, Market Structure, and the Welfare Effects of Mergers

We examine how forward contracts affect economic outcomes under generalized market structures. In the model, forward contracts discipline the exercise of market power by making profit less sensitive to changes in output. This impact is greatest in markets with intermediate levels of concentration. Mergers reduce the use of forward contracts in equilibrium and, in markets that are sufficiently concentrated, this ampli-fies the adverse effects on consumer surplus. Additional analyses of merger profitability and collusion are provided. Throughout, we illustrate and extend the theoretical re-sults using Monte Carlo simulations. The results have practical relevance for antitrust enforcement.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: EAG Discussion Paper ; No. EAG 17-2

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Miller, Nathan
Podwol, Joseph
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
(wo)
Washington, DC
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Miller, Nathan
  • Podwol, Joseph
  • U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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