Arbeitspapier
Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture
A fully unbundled, regulated network firm of unknown efficiency level can untertake unobservable effort to increase the likelihood of low downstream prices, e.g. by facilitating downstream competition. To incentivize such effort, the regulator can use an incentive scheme paying transfers to the firm contingent on realized downstream prices. Alternatively, the regulator can force the firm to sell the following forward contracts: the firm pays the downstream price to the owners of a contract, but recieves the expected value of the contracts when selling them to a competivitve financial market. We compare the two regulatory tools with respect to regulatory capture: if the regulator can be bribed to suppress information on the underlying state of the world (the basic propability of high downstream prices, or the type of the firm), optimal regulation uses forward contracts only.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 320
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Economics of Regulation
Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
Electric Utilities
- Thema
-
incentive regulation
regulatory capture
virtual power plants
Anreizregulierung
Derivat
Elektrizitätswirtschaft
Lieferantenmanagement
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Höffler, Felix
Kranz, Sebastian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13234
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13234-9
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Höffler, Felix
- Kranz, Sebastian
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2010
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