Arbeitspapier
Horizontal mergers, involuntary unemployment, and welfare
Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency effect increases welfare by reducing the costs of production (synergies). However, demand-side effects of synergies are usually neglected. We introduce them into a standard oligopoly model of horizontal merger by assuming an (empirically supported) decrease in labour demand due to merger-specific synergies and derive welfare effects. We find that efficiency benefits from horizontal mergers are substantially decreased, if involuntary unemployment exists. However, in full employment economies, demand-side effects remain negligible. Eventually, policy conclusions for merger control are discussed.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 2009,07
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Labor Economics: General
Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices
- Subject
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horizontal mergers
involuntary unemployment
efficiency defense
oligopoly
competition
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Budzinski, Oliver
Kretschmer, Jürgen-Peter
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
- (where)
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Marburg
- (when)
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2009
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Budzinski, Oliver
- Kretschmer, Jürgen-Peter
- Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
Time of origin
- 2009