Arbeitspapier

Managerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price Manipulation

I build a model of optimal managerial compensation where managers each have a privately observed propensity to manipulate short-term stock prices. It is shown that this informational asymmetry reverses some of the conventional wisdom about the relationship between reliance on short-term pay and propensity to manipulate. The optimal compensation scheme features a negative relationship between pay duration and manager manipulation activity, reconciling theory with recent empirical findings (Gopalan et al., 2014). Further, the model predicts that managers who spend more resources manipulating short-term stock prices also put more effort into generating longterm firm value.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2015-25

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Thema
Labour markets
Economic models
Recent economic and financial developments

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schroth, Josef
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2015-25
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schroth, Josef
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2015

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