Arbeitspapier

Managerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price Manipulation

I build a model of optimal managerial compensation where managers each have a privately observed propensity to manipulate short-term stock prices. It is shown that this informational asymmetry reverses some of the conventional wisdom about the relationship between reliance on short-term pay and propensity to manipulate. The optimal compensation scheme features a negative relationship between pay duration and manager manipulation activity, reconciling theory with recent empirical findings (Gopalan et al., 2014). Further, the model predicts that managers who spend more resources manipulating short-term stock prices also put more effort into generating longterm firm value.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2015-25

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Subject
Labour markets
Economic models
Recent economic and financial developments

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schroth, Josef
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2015-25
Handle
Last update
20.09.2024, 8:24 AM CEST

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schroth, Josef
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2015

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