Arbeitspapier
On the economics of international environmental agreements
This paper demonstrates that partial cooperation with respect to the use of an international environmental resource can emerge when countries are able to opt to breach an agreement. Although the option of non-compliance restricts the set of coalitions on those which embrace merely two members, broader cooperation can emerge when these two countries compensate a third country for extra reduction efforts. The paper discusses also a reversible and- a irreversible technology option and demonstrates that compensating a third country for the introduction of an irreversible technology may be even advantageous for the donors when this technology incurs higher costs than a reversible one.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Year: 1993 ; Kiel: Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
- Thema
-
Umweltabkommen
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Stähler, Frank
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
1993
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Stähler, Frank
- Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 1993
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