Arbeitspapier
Competitiveness and environmental policies in strategic environmental policy models
This paper discusses the issue of competitiveness and environmental regulation from the viewpoint of strategic environmental policy models. It demonstrates that the incentive for strategic policies is determined only by the reaction of the opponent. Furthermore, it shows that the conditions under which relatively strict environmental policies may lead to an increase in the profits of the domestic industry are rather artificial. The result depends in a rather complex way on the type of competition and several effects of research and development or environmental quality specification, and on the assumption that a unilateral policy is possible.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Year: 1998 ; Kiel: Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
- Thema
-
Umweltpolitik
Strategische Handelspolitik
Industrielle Forschung
Technologiewahl
Spieltheorie
Internationaler Wettbewerb
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Stähler, Frank
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
1998
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Stähler, Frank
- Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 1998
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