Arbeitspapier
International Agreements, Economic Sovereignty and Exit
We develop a model in which it is uncertainty about the future domestic policy environment that both makes international cooperation attractive and induces the possibility of a nation reneging on such an international agreement. We show, in a fairly general setting in which the likelihood of exit is affected by the degree of cooperation, that the possibility of exit reduces the optimal degree of initial cooperation. “Full” cooperation will never be optimal, and the optimal degree of cooperation will never be such as to “squeeze out” any possibility of exit. However, an increase in global uncertainty may imply an increase in cooperation when exit risks are already large to begin with.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6941
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
International Economic Order and Integration
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- Thema
-
international agreements
international cooperation
exit
sovereignty
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Richardson, Martin
Stähler, Frank
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Richardson, Martin
- Stähler, Frank
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2018
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