Arbeitspapier
Market Entry Regulation and International Competition
As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this game emerge; and if the cost difference between domestic and foreign firms is significant, all equilibria induce the same allocation, where production exclusively takes place in the cost-efficient country. Moreover, these equilibria are Pareto efficient if this cost difference is substantial. Only if cost differences are insignificant, may production take place in both countries in equilibrium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 979
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Economics of Regulation
- Thema
-
intergovernmental competition
competition policy
entry regulation
free market entry
international trade
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Upmann, Thorsten
Stähler, Frank
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Upmann, Thorsten
- Stähler, Frank
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2003
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