Arbeitspapier
The Multi-item Bisection Auction
This paper proposes an iterative sealed-bid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items with unit-demand agents. It generalizes the single item bisection auction (Grigorieva Et. al, 2007) to the environment with multiple heterogeneous items. We show that it elicits a minimal amount of information on preferences required to find the Vickrey-Clark-Groves outcome (Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961), when there are two items for sale and an arbitrary number of agents.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2011:31
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
- Subject
-
Bisection Auction
Multi-item
Unit-demand
Sealed-bid
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Erlanson, Albin
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Lund
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Erlanson, Albin
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2011
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