Arbeitspapier

Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction

This paper presents an open ascending price mechanism that allocates efficiently M units of the same good among N bidders with interdependent values The mechanism consists of a number of sequential English auctions with reentry and has the following attributes. In each of the individual auctions all the bidders compete simultaneously in the open ascending price format. The most distinctive feature of the mechanism is that winners are determined first, and then additional auxillary auctions are conducted to determine prices. The total number of auctions depends only on the number of goods to be allocated and not on the number of bidders.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 91.2004

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
Subject
Multiple units
Interdependent values
Sequential auctions
Ascending price auction
Auktionstheorie
Marktmechanismus
Allokationseffizienz

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Izmalkov, Sergei
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Izmalkov, Sergei
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2004

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