Arbeitspapier
Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction
This paper presents an open ascending price mechanism that allocates efficiently M units of the same good among N bidders with interdependent values The mechanism consists of a number of sequential English auctions with reentry and has the following attributes. In each of the individual auctions all the bidders compete simultaneously in the open ascending price format. The most distinctive feature of the mechanism is that winners are determined first, and then additional auxillary auctions are conducted to determine prices. The total number of auctions depends only on the number of goods to be allocated and not on the number of bidders.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 91.2004
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
- Subject
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Multiple units
Interdependent values
Sequential auctions
Ascending price auction
Auktionstheorie
Marktmechanismus
Allokationseffizienz
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Izmalkov, Sergei
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Izmalkov, Sergei
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2004