Arbeitspapier
The chopstick auction: a study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions
Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the chopstick auction' in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We do so both in theory and in a laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second-price sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the chopstick auction is less efficient than the second-price sealed-bid auction and that it yields more [the same] revenue if bidders are inexperienced [experienced].
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1782
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Englmaier, Florian
Guillén, Pablo
Llorente, Loreto
Onderstal, Sander
Sausgruber, Rupert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Englmaier, Florian
- Guillén, Pablo
- Llorente, Loreto
- Onderstal, Sander
- Sausgruber, Rupert
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2006
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