Arbeitspapier

Efficient Transfer of Aging Provisions in Private Health Insurance

In long-term private health insurance contracts, aging provisions are used to flatten premium profiles. An individual would like to change insurers if she perceives a low service quality. The first-best optimum is characterized by provision transfers which are higher for high risks and may be negative for low risks. Should the actual risk status not be verifiable, provision transfers have to be uniform. Efficient transfers will equalize consumption across periods and states if high risks are deterred from switching. Otherwise, the optimum transfer balances the distortions of incentives for high-risk and low-risk individuals.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 862

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
health insurance
multi-period contracts
competition
aging provisions

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Meier, Volker
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Meier, Volker
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2003

Ähnliche Objekte (12)