Arbeitspapier

Efficient Transfer of Aging Provisions in Private Health Insurance

In long-term private health insurance contracts, aging provisions are used to flatten premium profiles. An individual would like to change insurers if she perceives a low service quality. The first-best optimum is characterized by provision transfers which are higher for high risks and may be negative for low risks. Should the actual risk status not be verifiable, provision transfers have to be uniform. Efficient transfers will equalize consumption across periods and states if high risks are deterred from switching. Otherwise, the optimum transfer balances the distortions of incentives for high-risk and low-risk individuals.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 862

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
health insurance
multi-period contracts
competition
aging provisions

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Meier, Volker
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
20.09.2024, 8:25 AM CEST

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Meier, Volker
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2003

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