Arbeitspapier
Efficient Transfer of Aging Provisions in Private Health Insurance
In long-term private health insurance contracts, aging provisions are used to flatten premium profiles. An individual would like to change insurers if she perceives a low service quality. The first-best optimum is characterized by provision transfers which are higher for high risks and may be negative for low risks. Should the actual risk status not be verifiable, provision transfers have to be uniform. Efficient transfers will equalize consumption across periods and states if high risks are deterred from switching. Otherwise, the optimum transfer balances the distortions of incentives for high-risk and low-risk individuals.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 862
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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health insurance
multi-period contracts
competition
aging provisions
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Meier, Volker
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2003
- Handle
- Last update
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20.09.2024, 8:25 AM CEST
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Meier, Volker
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2003