Arbeitspapier
Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games
We show that small switching costs can have surprisingly dramatic effects in infinitely repeated games if these costs are large relative to payoffs in a single period. This shows that the results in Lipman and Wang [2000] do have analogs in the case of infinitely repeated games. We also discuss whether the results here or those in Lipman and Wang [2000] imply a discontinuity in the equilibrium outcome correspondence with respect to small switching costs. We conclude that there is not a discontinuity with respect to switching costs but that the switching costs do create a discontinuity with respect to the length of a period.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1032
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
infinite horizon
repeated games
switching costs
Folk Theorem
Wiederholte Spiele
Wechselverhalten
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lipman, Barton
Wang, Ruqu
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Kingston (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lipman, Barton
- Wang, Ruqu
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2006
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