Arbeitspapier
Information Revelation in Infinitely Repeated Incomplete Information Games
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 692
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bergin, James
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1986
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bergin, James
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1986
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Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems
Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games
Compressed equilibrium in large repeated games of incomplete information
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Tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Strategy choice in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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