Arbeitspapier

Bargaining under Time Pressure

We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure in a rich-context, unstructured bargaining game with earned status and competing reference points. Our results show that average opening proposals, concessions, and agreed shares are very similar across different levels of time pressure. Nevertheless, as predicted, time pressure systematically influenced agreements. In particular, the likelihood of bargainers reaching the explicit reference point outcome in agreements increases with time pressure, and the likelihood of reaching the implicit reference point (equal division) in agreements decreases with time pressure. Disagreement rates and the frequency of last-moment agreements are strongly affected: the disagreement rate rises dramatically with time pressure, and last-moment agreements are significantly more frequent. This effect is explained by a stronger connection between the tension in first proposals and the final bargaining outcome under time pressure than without time pressure.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5685

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Thema
bargaining
disagreements
last-moment agreements
reference points
time pressure

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Karagözoglu, Emin
Kocher, Martin G.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Karagözoglu, Emin
  • Kocher, Martin G.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2015

Ähnliche Objekte (12)