Collective Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts

Arbeitspapier

We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and profits coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-041/3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects ; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
• Thema: Collective bargaining ; union ; firm ; bargaining power ; non-binding contract ; Tarifverhandlungen ; Verhandlungsmacht ; Kooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dobbelaere, Sabien ; Luttens, Roland Iwan
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86854
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ