Arbeitspapier
Altruism and Relational Incentives in the Workplace
This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The con- tract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that altruism undermines the credibility of a threat of dis- missal but strengthens the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that higher altruism sometimes leads to higher bonuses, while lower altruism may increase productivity and players utility in equilibrium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7363
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices
- Thema
-
altruism
spite
incentives
relational contracts
efficiency wages
subjective performance evaluation
Nash bargaining
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dur, Robert A. J.
Tichem, Jan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dur, Robert A. J.
- Tichem, Jan
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2013
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Relational Altruism and Giving in Social Groups
Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives
Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Social interaction, co-Worker altruism, and incentives
Social relations and relational incentives
Social Relations and Relational Incentives
Social incentives in the workplace
Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning
Altruism Begets Altruism
Family ties, incentives and development: A model of coerced altruism
Why volunteer? Evidence on the role of altruism, reputation, and incentives
Social Relations, Incentives, and Gender in the Workplace
Relational Altruism and Giving in Social Groups
Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives
Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Social interaction, co-Worker altruism, and incentives
Social relations and relational incentives
Social Relations and Relational Incentives
Social incentives in the workplace
Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning
Altruism Begets Altruism
Family ties, incentives and development: A model of coerced altruism
Why volunteer? Evidence on the role of altruism, reputation, and incentives
Social Relations, Incentives, and Gender in the Workplace
Relational Altruism and Giving in Social Groups
Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives
Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Social interaction, co-Worker altruism, and incentives
Social relations and relational incentives
Social Relations and Relational Incentives
Social incentives in the workplace
Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning
Altruism Begets Altruism
Family ties, incentives and development: A model of coerced altruism
Why volunteer? Evidence on the role of altruism, reputation, and incentives