Arbeitspapier
Social Relations and Relational Incentives
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that good social relationships undermine the credibility of a threat of dismissal but strengthen the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that better social relationships sometimes lead to higher bonuses, while worse social relationships may increase productivity and players' utility in equilibrium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 12-054/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices
- Thema
-
Altruism
spite
social relations
incentives
relational contracts
efficiency wages
subjective performance evaluation
Nash bargaining
Arbeitsbeziehungen
Soziale Beziehungen
Leistungsanreiz
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Dynamisches Spiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dur, Robert
Tichem, Jan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dur, Robert
- Tichem, Jan
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2012
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