Arbeitspapier
Efficient Inequity-Averse Teams
This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that full efficiency can be sustained as an equilibrium through a budget-balancing mechanism that punishes some randomly chosen agents if output falls short of efficient level but distributes the output equally otherwise, provided that the agents are sufficiently inequity averse.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 210
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Thema
-
moral hazard
team production
inequity aversion
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Li, Jianpei
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2007
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13342
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13342-9
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Li, Jianpei
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2007
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Are Teams Less Inequality Averse than Individuals?
Updating ambiguity averse preferences
Dissecting Inequality-Averse Preferences
Are World Leaders Loss Averse?
Risk-Averse Monopolist with Aspiration
Are Women Status-Ranking Averse?
The Expectation-Based Loss-Averse Newsvendor
The Expectation-Based Loss-Averse Newsvendor
Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents
Procurement design with loss averse bidders
Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents
Are Teams Less Inequality Averse than Individuals?
Updating ambiguity averse preferences
Dissecting Inequality-Averse Preferences
Are World Leaders Loss Averse?
Risk-Averse Monopolist with Aspiration
Are Women Status-Ranking Averse?
The Expectation-Based Loss-Averse Newsvendor
The Expectation-Based Loss-Averse Newsvendor
Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents
Procurement design with loss averse bidders
Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents
Are Teams Less Inequality Averse than Individuals?
Updating ambiguity averse preferences
Dissecting Inequality-Averse Preferences
Are World Leaders Loss Averse?
Risk-Averse Monopolist with Aspiration
Are Women Status-Ranking Averse?
The Expectation-Based Loss-Averse Newsvendor
The Expectation-Based Loss-Averse Newsvendor
Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents
Procurement design with loss averse bidders
Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties