Arbeitspapier

Efficient Inequity-€“Averse Teams

This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that full efficiency can be sustained as an equilibrium through a budget-balancing mechanism that punishes some randomly chosen agents if output falls short of efficient level but distributes the output equally otherwise, provided that the agents are sufficiently inequity averse.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 210

Classification
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Subject
moral hazard
team production
inequity aversion

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Li, Jianpei
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2007

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13342
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13342-9
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Li, Jianpei
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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