Arbeitspapier
Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity
The present paper first discusses theoretically the different incentives of manager- versus owner-controlled firms for investment into innovative activity. In addition, the role of debt financing is analyzed. Subsequently the results from an empirical study on the determinants of innovative activity measured by patent applications are presented. A sample of German firms covering 2,793 observations is used, and it turns out that companies with widely held capital stock are more active in innovation, i.e. weakly controlled managers show a higher innovation propensity. However, the higher the leverage the more disciplined the managers are.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 04-75
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
- Thema
-
Innovation
Patents
Corporate Governance
Limited Dependent Variables
Innovation
Betriebliche Investitionspolitik
Eigentümerstruktur
Fremdkapital
Patent
Schätzung
Corporate Governance
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Czarnitzki, Dirk
Kraft, Kornelius
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Czarnitzki, Dirk
- Kraft, Kornelius
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Entstanden
- 2004