Arbeitspapier

Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity

The present paper first discusses theoretically the different incentives of manager- versus owner-controlled firms for investment into innovative activity. In addition, the role of debt financing is analyzed. Subsequently the results from an empirical study on the determinants of innovative activity measured by patent applications are presented. A sample of German firms covering 2,793 observations is used, and it turns out that companies with widely held capital stock are more active in innovation, i.e. weakly controlled managers show a higher innovation propensity. However, the higher the leverage the more disciplined the managers are.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 04-75

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
Thema
Innovation
Patents
Corporate Governance
Limited Dependent Variables
Innovation
Betriebliche Investitionspolitik
Eigentümerstruktur
Fremdkapital
Patent
Schätzung
Corporate Governance
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Czarnitzki, Dirk
Kraft, Kornelius
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Czarnitzki, Dirk
  • Kraft, Kornelius
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Entstanden

  • 2004

Ähnliche Objekte (12)