Arbeitspapier

Management Control and Innovative Activity

This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning this question. A sample of German firms with 3,978 observations is used and it turns out that the owner-led firms invest less into R&D than the managerial firms. With respect to the managerled firms, expenditures on R&D depend on the control exerted. If capital shares are widely dispersed and managers are thus only controlled a little by owners, they invest more into R&D. Owner-led firms and managers who are strongly controlled have a very similar R&D intensity.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 00-68

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models; Threshold Regression Models
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Firm Behavior: Theory
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Thema
Innovative Activity
Managerial versus Owner-led Firms
Incentives
Tobit Regression
Innovation
Industrielle Forschung
Investition
Eigentümerstruktur
Corporate Governance
Schätzung
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Czarnitzki, Dirk
Kraft, Kornelius
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Czarnitzki, Dirk
  • Kraft, Kornelius
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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