Arbeitspapier
Management Control and Innovative Activity
This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning this question. A sample of German firms with 3,978 observations is used and it turns out that the owner-led firms invest less into R&D than the managerial firms. With respect to the managerled firms, expenditures on R&D depend on the control exerted. If capital shares are widely dispersed and managers are thus only controlled a little by owners, they invest more into R&D. Owner-led firms and managers who are strongly controlled have a very similar R&D intensity.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 00-68
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models; Threshold Regression Models
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Firm Behavior: Theory
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- Thema
-
Innovative Activity
Managerial versus Owner-led Firms
Incentives
Tobit Regression
Innovation
Industrielle Forschung
Investition
Eigentümerstruktur
Corporate Governance
Schätzung
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Czarnitzki, Dirk
Kraft, Kornelius
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Czarnitzki, Dirk
- Kraft, Kornelius
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Entstanden
- 2000