Arbeitspapier
Doping and cheating in contest-like situations
Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping or cheating within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major effects are identified which determine a player's doping decision - a cost effect, a likelihood effect and a windfall-profit effect. Moreover, we discuss whether the favorite or the underdog is more likely to be doped, the impact of doping on overall performance, the influence of increased heterogeneity on doping, the welfare implications of doping, and possible prevention of doping.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2059
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Thema
-
cheating
contest
doping
fraud in research
tournament
Betrug
Professioneller Sport
Drogenkonsum
Wettbewerb
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kräkel, Matthias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kräkel, Matthias
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2006
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