Arbeitspapier
On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods
The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a pro t-maximizing rm. This also makes participation constraints desirable.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2009,15
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Public Goods
Economics of Regulation
- Thema
-
Public goods
Mechanism Design
Incomplete Contracts
Regulation
Öffentliches Gut
Finanzierung
Mechanism
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Allokationseffizienz
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bierbrauer, Felix
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bierbrauer, Felix
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2009
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods
On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods
On the legitimacy of coercion for the nancing of public goods
Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods
Optimal income taxation, public goods provision and robust mechanism design
Optimal income taxation and public-goods provision with preference and productivity shocks
Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy
Optimal income taxation and public good provision in a two-class economy
Optimal income taxation and public goods provision in a large economy with aggregate uncertainty
A unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxation
Nachhaltigkeitsziele und das Lieferkettengesetz
On the incidence of a financial transactions tax in a model with fire sales
On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods
On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods
On the legitimacy of coercion for the nancing of public goods
Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods
Optimal income taxation, public goods provision and robust mechanism design
Optimal income taxation and public-goods provision with preference and productivity shocks
Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy
Optimal income taxation and public good provision in a two-class economy
Optimal income taxation and public goods provision in a large economy with aggregate uncertainty
A unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxation
Nachhaltigkeitsziele und das Lieferkettengesetz
On the incidence of a financial transactions tax in a model with fire sales
On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods
On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods
On the legitimacy of coercion for the nancing of public goods
Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods
Optimal income taxation, public goods provision and robust mechanism design
Optimal income taxation and public-goods provision with preference and productivity shocks
Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy
Optimal income taxation and public good provision in a two-class economy
Optimal income taxation and public goods provision in a large economy with aggregate uncertainty
A unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxation
Nachhaltigkeitsziele und das Lieferkettengesetz