Arbeitspapier
On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods
The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a pro t-maximizing rm. This also makes participation constraints desirable.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2009,15
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Public Goods
Economics of Regulation
- Subject
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Public goods
Mechanism Design
Incomplete Contracts
Regulation
Öffentliches Gut
Finanzierung
Mechanism
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Allokationseffizienz
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bierbrauer, Felix
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2009
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bierbrauer, Felix
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Time of origin
- 2009
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