Electoral Cycles in MPs' Salaries: Evidence from the German States

Arbeitspapier

Members of parliament (MPs) often decide on their own salaries. Voters dislike self-serving politicians, and politicians are keen to gratify their voters. In line with the political business cycle theories, politicians thus may well delay deciding on increases in salaries until after elections. We investigate electoral cycles in the salary increases of German state MPs. Using data for 15 states over the period 1980-2014, the results do not show that decisions on increases in MPs’ salaries were influenced by elections. In fact, MPs’ salaries increased by 0.30 to 0.37 percent when employees’ salaries increased by one percent. Politicians can increase their salaries at any point of time in the legislative period: understanding that all politicians benefit from an increase in salaries, voters may only be disenchanted with politics in general, without punishing individual incumbent parties.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6028

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General ; Relation of Economics to Social Values
• Thema: electoral cycles ; political business cycles ; election-motivated politicians ; MPs’ salaries ; rent extraction

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kauder, Björn ; Krause, Manuela ; Potrafke, Niklas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145063
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ