Arbeitspapier

Endogenous leverage and default in the laboratory

We study default and endogenous leverage in the laboratory. To this purpose, we develop a general equilibrium model of collateralized borrowing amenable to laboratory implementation and gather experimental data. In the model, leverage is endogenous: agents choose how much to borrow using a risky asset as collateral, and there are no ad hoc collateral constraints. When the risky asset is financial-namely, its payoff does not depend on ownership (such as a bond)- collateral requirements are high and there is no default. In contrast, when the risky asset is nonfinancial-namely, its payoff depends on ownership (such as a firm)-collateral requirements are lower and default occurs. The experimental outcomes are in line with the theory's main predictions. The type of collateral, whether financial or not, matters. Default rates and loss from default are higher when the risky asset is nonfinancial, stemming from laxer collateral requirements. Default rates and collateral requirements move closer to the theoretical predictions as the experiment progresses.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Staff Report ; No. 900

Classification
Wirtschaft
General Economics: General
Design of Experiments: General
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Subject
collateral
default
double auction
experimental economics
leverage

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cipriani, Marco
Fostel, Ana
Houser, Daniel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(where)
New York, NY
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cipriani, Marco
  • Fostel, Ana
  • Houser, Daniel
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Time of origin

  • 2019

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