Konferenzbeitrag
Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government?
A country's form of government has important economic and political consequences, but the determinants that lead societies to choose either parliamentary or presidential systems are largely unexplored. This paper studies this choice by analyzing the factors that make countries switch from parliamentary to presidential systems (or vice versa). The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we identify the survival probability of the existing form of government (drawing on a proportional hazard model). In our model, which is based on 169 countries, we find that geographical factors and former colonial status are important determinants of survival probability. Also, presidential systems are, ceteris paribus, more likely to survive than parliamentary ones. Second, given that a change has taken place, we identify the underlying reasons based on panel data logit models. We find that domestic political factors are more important than economic ones. The most important factors relate to intermediate internal armed conflict, sectarian political participation, degree of democratization, and party competition, as well as the extent to which knowledge resources are distributed among the members of society.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Political Economy: The Effect of Constitutional Rules ; No. C17-V2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
- Thema
-
Constitutional change
institutional dynamics
form of government
endogenous constitutions
separation of powers
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hayo, Bernd
Voigt, Stefan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Verein für Socialpolitik
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Hayo, Bernd
- Voigt, Stefan
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Entstanden
- 2010
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