Arbeitspapier

Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don't

We study changes in the form of government as an example of endogenously determined constitutions. For a sample of 202 countries over the period 1950-2006, we find that most changes are relatively small and roughly equally likely to be either in the direction of more parliamentarian or more presidential systems. Based on a fixed effects ordered logit panel data model estimated over the period 1951-2000 for 146 countries, we find that such changes in the constitution can be explained by characteristics of the political system, internal and external political conflicts, and political leaders, whereas economic and socio-demographic variables do not matter.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 27-2010

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
Thema
constitutional change
form of government
endogenous constitutions
separation of powers
relevance of leaders
Verfassungsreform
Politisches System
Gewaltenteilung
Politiker
Schätzung
Welt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hayo, Bernd
Voigt, Stefan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
(wo)
Marburg
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hayo, Bernd
  • Voigt, Stefan
  • Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Entstanden

  • 2010

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