Arbeitspapier
Uncovered bargaining solutions
An uncovered bargaining solution is a bargaining solution for which there exists a complete and strict relation (tournament) such that, for each feasible set, the bargaining solution set coincides with the uncovered set of the tournament. We provide a characterization of a class of uncovered bargaining solutions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 608
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
- Thema
-
Bargaining
Tournaments
Uncovered set
Non-convex problems
Verhandlungstheorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Auktionstheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lombardi, Michele
Mariotti, Marco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
London
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lombardi, Michele
- Mariotti, Marco
- Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2007
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