Arbeitspapier
A "tragedy of the clubs": Excess entry in exclusive coalitions
We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the "tragedy of the clubs". The tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 58.1999
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
Clubs
Coalition formation
Multiperson bargaining
Clubtheorie
Koalition
Spieltheorie
Wirtschaftliche Effizienz
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Manzini, Paola
Mariotti, Marco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Manzini, Paola
- Mariotti, Marco
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 1999
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