Arbeitspapier
Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision: The European Case
This paper discusses the incentive conflicts that arise in banking supervision in the EU in a principal-agent framework, where the regulator is the agent and the taxpayers is the principal. The regulatory agent in addition to maintaining financial stability (the objective of the principal) may pursue private interests. Incomplete information, insufficient accountability of the agent and lack of enforceability of compliance result in an incentive problem. A reform of the European supervisory system complemented by strengthening market discipline based on improved disclosure of both the supervisor and the banks may help to solve the European incentive problem.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 03-62
Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
banking regulation and supervision
principal-agent
European Union
Bankenaufsicht
Wahlverhalten
Bank
Agency Theory
Ökonomischer Anreiz
EU-Staaten
principal-agent
European Union
Bankenaufsicht
Wahlverhalten
Bank
Agency Theory
Ökonomischer Anreiz
EU-Staaten
Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schüler, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schüler, Martin
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Entstanden
- 2003
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