Arbeitspapier
Regulating deferred incentive pay
Our paper evaluates recent regulatory proposals mandating the deferral of bonus payments and claw-back clauses in the financial sector. We study a broadly applicable principal agent setting, in which the agent exerts effort for an immediately observable task (acquisition) and a task for which information is only gradually available over time (diligence). Optimal compensation contracts trade off the cost and benefit of delay resulting from agent impatience and the informational gain. Mandatory deferral may increase or decrease equilibrium diligence depending on the importance of the acquisition task. We provide concrete conditions on economic primitives that make mandatory deferral socially (un)desirable.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IMFS Working Paper Series ; No. 91
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
-
financial regulation
compensation design
principal-agent models
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hoffmann, Florian
Inderst, Roman
Opp, Marcus
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-374832
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hoffmann, Florian
- Inderst, Roman
- Opp, Marcus
- Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
Entstanden
- 2015
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