Arbeitspapier
Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay
We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm. Finally, managers of more risky and less profitable divisions should obtain steeper incentives to facilitate efficient investment decisions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IMFS Working Paper Series ; No. 33
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Inderst, Roman
Klein, Manuel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-72931
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Inderst, Roman
- Klein, Manuel
- Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
Entstanden
- 2009
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