Arbeitspapier

A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-cooperative Games

Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a number of axioms such a measure should satisfy and show that they characterise a unique function. The principle underlying this measure is that the influence of a player can be assessed according to how much changes in this player's preferences affect outcomes. Considering specific classes of games, our approach nests existing measures of power. We present applications to cartel formation, the non- cooperative model of the household, and legislative bargaining.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16809

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Thema
bargaining power
non-cooperative games

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goerlach, Joseph-Simon
Motz, Nicolas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2024

Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goerlach, Joseph-Simon
  • Motz, Nicolas
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2024

Ähnliche Objekte (12)