Arbeitspapier
A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-cooperative Games
Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a number of axioms such a measure should satisfy and show that they characterise a unique function. The principle underlying this measure is that the influence of a player can be assessed according to how much changes in this player's preferences affect outcomes. Considering specific classes of games, our approach nests existing measures of power. We present applications to cartel formation, the non- cooperative model of the household, and legislative bargaining.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16809
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- Subject
-
bargaining power
non-cooperative games
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Goerlach, Joseph-Simon
Motz, Nicolas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2024
- Last update
-
07.03.2025, 10:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Goerlach, Joseph-Simon
- Motz, Nicolas
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2024