Arbeitspapier

A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-cooperative Games

Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a number of axioms such a measure should satisfy and show that they characterise a unique function. The principle underlying this measure is that the influence of a player can be assessed according to how much changes in this player's preferences affect outcomes. Considering specific classes of games, our approach nests existing measures of power. We present applications to cartel formation, the non- cooperative model of the household, and legislative bargaining.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16809

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Subject
bargaining power
non-cooperative games

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Goerlach, Joseph-Simon
Motz, Nicolas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2024

Last update
07.03.2025, 10:41 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Goerlach, Joseph-Simon
  • Motz, Nicolas
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2024

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